Open Hearing: Worldwide Threats Hearing

[Senate Hearing 114-623] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 114-623 CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 20-544 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK WARNER, Virginia SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio ---------- Chris Joyner, Staff Director Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director Desiree Thompson Sayle, Chief Clerk CONTENTS ---------- FEBRUARY 9, 2016 OPENING STATEMENTS Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1 Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California..................................................... 2 WITNESS Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied by: John Brennan, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; LtGen Vincent Stewart, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; James Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Adm Michael Rogers, Director, National Security Agency............. 4 Prepared statement........................................... 9 CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES ---------- TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Feinstein, Coats, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Warner, Heinrich, King, and Hirono. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA Chairman Burr. I'd like to call the hearing to order, and I'd like to welcome our witnesses today: Director of National Intelligence James Clapper; Director of Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan; Director of Defense Intelligence Agency General Vincent Stewart; Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Jim Comey; and Director of the National Security Agency Admiral Rogers. To each of you, welcome. I'd note that Director Clapper and General Stewart have already appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning and I appreciate you both suffering through a very long day of testimony. I also thank our other witnesses for their attendance and participation. Today's hearing presents an opportunity for both the witnesses and the members of the committee. It's my sincere hope that our discussion will shed some light on the dedicated and tireless work of our intelligence community professionals, the men and women represented by our witnesses. Their efforts to keep America safe often go unrecognized, but that does not mean it goes unnoticed. I've spent the better part of 20 years as a member of the Congressional intelligence committees and have seen the scale, scope, and type of threats to our Nation evolve greatly. We no longer live in a world defined by a few distinct and well- defined threats. Our intelligence professionals are faced with collecting against and analyzing the threat posed by a range of actors from nation-states on down to home-grown violent extremists. Director Clapper, in your statement you've pulled together the collective expertise of the intelligence community's extraordinary men and women. We value your laying out for our benefit the diverse and evolving and decentralized system of threats that imperil this Nation and its interests across the globe. I ask that everyone take a moment to reflect on the range of expertise required to make sense of this information. I note in your statement that cyber and, more broadly, technology headline your global threats. I agree with the assessment that innovation and increased reliance on information technology in the next few years will have significant consequences on society's way of life and, more specifically, how your officers perform their mission. I look forward to your highlighting some of the challenges and consequences as you see them. I also remain concerned by the technological reach of ISIL and the danger of their using the information technology, social media, online unlimited research capabilities we use every day to propagate their barbaric message. Jim, I do hope you'll dedicate some time to laying out that particular threat, and I thank you again for being here today. I'd like to also highlight for my colleagues that the Committee will be holding a classified hearing on worldwide threats later this week. To the degree it needs saying, please reserve any questions that you think might not be appropriate for an open session until the Thursday hearing. With that, again I welcome our witnesses here today and I turn to the Vice Chairman for any comments she might have. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses and also thanking the intelligence community for its service to this country. I also share your sentiment that this annual open hearing is important to help explain to the American people the threats that face this Nation and the efforts of the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community to keep us safe. I want to open my comments by recognizing the significant contributions made by you, Director Clapper, as the leader of this community. You're the longest serving Director of National Intelligence to date and I think both the Chairman and I remember when this, the DNI, was developed and put into effect. Your capable stewardship of the community has driven it to be a more integrated and capable organization than at any time in history. So I want to personally thank you for the contributions you have made to this country's security. But, as you know, there is no rest for the weary. The threats that face this Nation and our allies seem only to grow. The Syrian war is approaching its fifth year. Yet Bashar Al- Assad is still in power and a refugee crisis is destroying the lives of millions of innocent families and wreaking havoc across Europe. We are witnessing the resurgence of an unpredictable Russia in Eastern Europe and Syria. North Korea last month conducted its fourth nuclear bomb test and two days ago conducted what it called a space launch. Of course, this is actually a thinly veiled test to develop missiles that could deliver weapons of mass destruction against a number of countries, including the United States. While these threats are significant and troubling, we are all deeply concerned about the threat from ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and other terrorist groups. To us, ISIL is much more than a regional threat within the Syrian and Iraqi borders. It's a terrorist army, a global exporter of terrorism, with a presence in a number of countries. The official count is 11, including ISIL affiliates. But some of our friends, like the King of Jordan, have said they're in as many as 17 countries. And ISIL has the ability to spread its message of hate and violence around the world using social media in a very sophisticated way. Director Clapper, I've read your written comments and am very much interested in your assessment of these global threats, their status today, and the outlook for the future. I'd also ask you to comment on how the intelligence community is positioned to address these threats. Is it better today than it was, let's say, five years ago? For instance, while the coalition's air campaign is helping to deny ISIL some territorial safe havens and financial resources, how do we degrade it and destroy it if all they need to carry out an attack on the West is an Internet connection and an encrypted message application? I'd like to hear your assessments of how the rise of end- to-end encryption has impacted our Nation's ability to identify and track individuals who seek to do us harm. Director Comey has spoken of this concern often. Director Rogers recently highlighted it as well. I'm interested in your views today about its impact and how you recommend we tackle this problem of terrorists and criminals communicating via these encrypted message applications. The U.S. Freedom Act that passed last year eliminated the bulk collection of telephone communications metadata, and the new law now requires specific queries, with FISA Court approval, to individual telecommunication companies. Has this change affected your ability to discover new threats and relationships? I'll save the rest of my comments for questions. But, gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. We look forward to discussion. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman. Before I recognize Director Clapper, let me say to members it's my intent--hopefully it's been conveyed to all members-- you will be recognized for five minutes in the order that you appeared, with one exception. If there is no objection, when Director Clapper's testimony is over I would like to recognize Senator Lankford for a first set of questions, for the simple reason that on Tuesdays he has to preside over the Senate, and he has to preside at 3:20 today and I'd like to let him get a set of questions in. So, Jim, James, you will be recognized. With that, the floor is yours, Director Clapper. STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY: JOHN BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LtGen VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; JAMES COMEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ADM MICHAEL ROGERS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Director Clapper. Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein, members of the committee: First, Chairman Burr, thanks very much for the acknowledgment particularly of the great men and of women of the U.S. intelligence community whom we represent here today. It's very appropriate that you do that for the great work that they do. And, Madam Vice Chairman, thanks very much for acknowledging my long service. It's very gracious of you. We're here today to update you on some, but certainly not all, of the pressing intelligence and national security issues facing our Nation, many of which you both alluded to, and so there will be a certain amount of echo here, I guess. In the interest of time and to get to your questions, we'll cover just some of the wavetops, and mine will be the only opening statement so we can go to your questions. I apologize in advance to the crossover members who were present this morning at the Senate Armed Services Committee. But in the highest traditions of that's our story, we're sticking to it, it'll be the same statement. As I said last year, unpredictable instability has become the new normal and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40 countries. Seven countries are experiencing a collapse of central government authority and 14 others face regime- threatening or violent instability or both. Another 59 countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016. The record level of migrants, more than one million arriving in Europe, is likely to grow further this year. Migration and displacement will strain countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. There are some 60 million people worldwide considered displaced. Extreme weather, climate change, environmental degradation, rising demand for food and water, poor policy decisions, and inadequate infrastructure will magnify this instability. Infectious diseases and vulnerabilities in the global supply chain for medical countermeasures will continue to pose threats. For example, the Zika virus, first detected in the Western Hemisphere in 2014, has reached the U.S. and is projected to cause up to four million cases in this hemisphere. With that preface, I want to briefly comment on both technology and cyber specifically. Technological innovation during the next few years will have an even more significant impact on our way of life. This innovation is central to our economic prosperity, but it will bring new security vulnerabilities. The Internet of Things will connect tens of billions of physical devices that could be exploited. Artificial intelligence will enable computers to make autonomous decisions about data and physical systems and potentially disrupt labor markets. Russia and China continue to have the most sophisticated cyber programs. China continues cyber espionage against the United States. Whether China's commitment of last September moderates its economic espionage remains to be seen. Iran and North Korea continue to conduct cyber espionage as they enhance their attack capabilities. Non-state actors also pose cyber threats. ISIL has used cyber to its great advantage, not only for recruitment and propaganda, but also to hack and release sensitive information about U.S. military personnel. As a non-state actor, ISIL displays unprecedented online proficiency. Cyber criminals remain the most pervasive cyber threat to the U.S. financial sector. They use cyber to conduct theft, extortion, and other criminal activities. Turning to terrorism, there are now more Sunni violent extremist groups, members, and safe havens than at any time in history. The rate of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq in the past few years is without precedent. At least 38,200 foreign fighters, including at least 6,900 from western countries, have traveled to Syria from at least 120 countries since the beginning of the conflict in 2012. As we saw in the November Paris attacks, returning foreign fighters with firsthand battlefield experience pose a dangerous operational threat. ISIL has demonstrated sophisticated attack tactics and tradecraft. ISIL, including its eight established and several more emerging branches, has become the preeminent global terrorist threat. ISIL has attempted or conducted scores of attacks outside of Syria and Iraq in the last 15 months, and ISIL's estimated strength globally now exceeds that of Al- Qaeda. ISIL's leaders are determined to strike the U.S. homeland beyond inspiring home-grown violent extremist attacks. Although the U.S. is a harder target than Europe, ISIL external operations remain a critical factor in our threat assessment for 2016. Al-Qaeda's affiliates also have proven resilient. Despite counterterrorism pressure that's largely decimated the core leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda affiliates are positioned to make gains in 2016. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Al-Nusra Front, the Al-Qaeda chapter in Syria, are the two most capable Al-Qaeda branches. The increased use by violent extremists of encrypted and secure Internet and mobile-based technologies enables terrorist actors to go dark and serves to undercut intelligence and law enforcement efforts. Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and exerts its influence in regional crises in the Middle East through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, its terrorist partner Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxy groups. Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests and partners worldwide. We saw firsthand the threat posed to the United States by home-grown violent extremists in the July attack in Chattanooga and the attack in December in San Bernardino. In 2014 the FBI arrested nine ISIL supporters and in 2015 that number increased over fivefold. Turning to weapons of mass destruction, North Korea continues to conduct test activities of concern to the United States. On Saturday evening Pyongyang conducted a satellite launch and subsequently claimed that the satellite was successfully placed in orbit. Additionally, last month North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test, claiming it was a hydrogen bomb. But the yield was too low for it to have been a successful test of a thermonuclear device. Pyongyang continues to produce fissile material and develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is also committed to developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that's capable of posing a direct threat to the United States, although the system has not been flight tested. Despite its economic challenges, Russia continues its aggressive military modernization program. It has the largest and most capable foreign nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. It has developed a cruise missile that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty. China continues to modernize its nuclear missile force and is striving for a secure second strike capability. It continues to profess a ``no first use'' doctrine. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, provides us much greater transparency into Iran's fissile material production. It increases the time the Iranians would need to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year. Iran probably views the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some nuclear capability. Iran's perception of how the JCPOA helps it achieve its overall strategic goals will dictate its level of adherence or compliance to the agreement over time. Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat in Syria and Iraq. Damascus has used chemicals against the opposition on multiple occasions since Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. ISIL has also used toxic chemicals in Iraq and Syria, including the blister agent sulfur mustard--the first time an extremist group has produced and used a chemical warfare agent in an attack since Aum Shinrikyo used sarin in Japan in 1995. Turning to space and counter-space, there are about 80 countries that are now engaged in the space domain. Russia and China well understand how our military fights and how heavily we rely on space. They're each pursuing destructive and disruptive anti-satellite systems. China continues to make progress on its anti-satellite missile program. Moving to counter-intelligence, the threat from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-state, is persistent, complex, and evolving. Targeting collection of U.S. political, military, economic, and technical information by foreign intelligence services continues unabated. Russia and China pose the greatest threat, followed by Iran and Cuba on a lesser scale. As well, the threat from insiders taking advantage of their access to collect and remove sensitive national security information will remain a persistent challenge for us. With respect to trans-national organized crime, I do want to touch on one crime issue, specifically drug trafficking. Southwest border seizures of heroin in the United States have doubled since 2010. Over 10,000 people died of heroin overdoses in the United States in 2014, much of it laced with fentanyl, which is 30 to 50 times more potent than heroin. In that same year, more than 28,000 died from opiate overdoses. And cocaine production in Colombia, from which most U.S. supplies originate, has increased significantly. Now let me quickly move through a few regional issues. In East Asia, China's leaders are pursuing an active foreign policy while dealing with much slower economic growth. Chinese leaders have also embarked on the most ambitious military reforms in China's history. Regional tension will continue as China pursues construction at its outposts in the South China Sea. Russia has demonstrated its military capabilities to project itself as a global power, command respect from the West, maintain domestic support for the regime, and advance Russian interests globally. Moscow's objectives in the Ukraine will probably remain unchanged, including maintaining long-term influence over Kiev and frustrating its attempts to integrate into western institutions. Putin is the first leader since Stalin to expand Russia's territory. Moscow's military venture into Syria marks its first use since its foray into Afghanistan of significant expeditionary combat power outside of the post-Soviet space. Its interventions demonstrate the improvements in Russian military capabilities and the Kremlin's confidence in using them. Moscow faces the reality, however, of economic recession, driven in large part by falling oil prices as well as sanctions. Russia's nearly 4 percent GDP contraction last year will probably extend well into 2016. In the Mideast and South Asia, there are more cross-border military operations under way in the Mideast region than at any time since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Iraq, anti-ISIL forces in Iraq will probably make incremental gains through this spring similar to those made in Baiji and Ramadi in the past few months. ISIL is now somewhat on the defensive and its territory and manpower are shrinking, but it remains a formidable threat. In Syria, pro-regime forces have the initiative, having made some strategic gains near Aleppo and Latakia in the north, as well as in southern Syria. Manpower shortages, however, will continue to undermine the Syrian regime's ability to accomplish its strategic battlefield objectives. The opposition has less equipment and firepower and its groups lack unity. They sometimes have competing battlefield interests and fight among themselves. Meanwhile, some 250,000 people have been killed as this war has dragged on. The humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. As of last month, there were approximately 4.4 million Syrian refugees and another 6.5 million internally displaced persons, which together represent about one-half of Syria's population. In Libya, despite the December agreement to form a new government of national accord, establishing authority and security across the country will be difficult at best, with hundreds of militia groups operating throughout the country. ISIL has established its most developed branch outside of Syria in Libya--outside of Syria and Iraq, in Libya, and maintains a presence in Sirte, Benghazi, Tripoli, and other areas of the country. In Yemen, the conflict will probably remain stalemated through at least mid-2016. Meanwhile, AQAP and ISIL's affiliates in Yemen have exploited the conflict and the collapse of government authority to recruit and expand territorial control. The country's economic and humanitarian situation also continues to deteriorate. Iran deepened its involvement in the Syria, Iraqi and Yemeni conflicts in 2015. It also increased military cooperation with Russia, highlighted by its battlefield alliance in Syria in support of the regime. Iran's supreme leader continues to view the United States as a major threat. We assess his views will not change, despite the implementation of the JCPOA deal, the exchange of detainees, and the release of the 10 U.S. sailors. In South Asia, Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown during 2016, occasioned by mounting political, economic, and security challenges. Waning political cohesion, increasingly assertive local power brokers, financial shortfalls, and sustained countrywide Taliban attacks are eroding stability. Needless to say there are many more threats to U.S. interests worldwide that we can address, most of which are covered in our statement for the record. But I'll stop this litany of doom and open to your questions. Before I do that, I do want to answer one question that Madam Vice Chairman asked about the state of the community now vs. five years ago. I would like to think that we are better as a community just from the simple proposition of the sum being greater than the parts, because we operate as an integrated enterprise. Others may have a comment on that. None of them are unwilling to disagree with me, but that's my view. So I'll stop there and open to your questions. [The prepared statement of Director Clapper follows.] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Burr. Director Clapper, thank you for that testimony. I remind all members that everybody at the witness table is available for questions directed at them. With that, I'd recognize Senator Lankford for five minutes. Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To all of you, thank you. I do remind people back home, because in Oklahoma we're extremely grateful for many folks in the armed services that serve us every single day. We recognize them, see them, recognize them by their uniforms. But I remind them also that there are a lot of people in the intelligence community that they won't recognize at all and they'll never see and they'll never be able to thank personally. So would you pass on gratitude to them, and we are incredibly grateful for the very difficult work that they do every single day. Director Clapper, you said this morning in your 50 years in the intelligence business you can't recall a more diverse array of challenges. And you graced us with a long list of doom as you listed it just now, whether that be space, whether that be proliferation, whether that be radical Islamic terrorism and such. I want to focus on one of the areas that you talked about specifically and that's narcotics and the movement into our country and what we deal with on a day to day basis as a challenge. Again, this morning you had mentioned you thought the focus should be more on the interdiction. So my challenge is for this group and my interest: What are we doing on the intel gathering to be able to find out what's happening, the pathways that some of these narcotics are moving into the United States and the interdiction, and how we're cooperating among agencies, how's that communication going? Director Clapper. Well, sir, the challenge, as I indicated this morning--and I hark back to a series of testimonies by General Kelly, the former commander of the Southern Command, in which he made the point that we did have a great deal of intelligence on drug flow into the United States--our challenge has been the lack of resources sometimes to react to it, to actually interdict it. So in one sense I think that's a plea or a commercial for more operational assets to respond. I'm a big fan of the Coast Guard and I think the Coast Guard has done some great work. The deployment of these new Coast Guard cutters, which has a national security component to it, has had a dramatic impact when they've been able to be employed. So to me the big thing here is the operational resource to respond. I think the community works very well together on the issue of drug intelligence and facilitating interdiction. Senator Lankford. Any comments on that from any of the other leaders? [No response.] Let me move on then as well, because there's been a lot of conversation about Libya and ISIL and their movement into other areas they call provinces and moving all around the world. Libya has been especially large in that. What do you think is ISIL's intention in Libya? Director Clapper. Well, I think not unlike what they've done with Syria and Iraq. What's unique about ISIL, of course, is its possession and control over territory, and that's been the case in Syria and Iraq, and of course that presents certain vulnerabilities when they assume the accoutrements or the traits of a nation- state. I think it's similarly their goal in Libya. It's essentially an ungoverned space and also access to substantial oil resources, just as they've had in Syria. So I think there is some commonality. They're right now kind of centered or headquartered in Sirte, which is kind of in the center of the coast of Libya, and they're trying to spread out along the coast and take over more and more areas. They are present, as I indicated in my statement, in the major cities, notably Benghazi and Tripoli. Senator Lankford. You mentioned as well about Iran still being the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. How have you seen that role and that direction towards terrorism and support of terrorism since the signing of the JCPOA? Since that has occurred, have you seen a change in Iran's behavior towards sponsoring terrorism? Director Clapper. Have not seen a change in the behavior of the Quds Force. They are right now kind of consumed with the situation in Iraq and Syria, and as well in supporting the Houthis in Yemen. So that has been the focus predominantly. That's not to say they're not interested elsewhere, but that's where the focus of their efforts has been. Senator Lankford. Again, you had mentioned this morning that there have been about 140 missiles launched by Iran in violation of UN agreements, and then two additional just in the last few months. Any change in behavior you've seen in their testing of ballistic missiles? Director Clapper. No. You're exactly right, Senator Lankford, that's what I said. Since 2010 and the promulgation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1929, they've fired about 140 missiles. About half of that took place during the negotiations. They launched two, one in October and one in November, which I personally think was a message that they are still going to continue to develop what is already a very robust missile force. Senator Lankford. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Lankford. The Chair would recognize himself for a couple of questions. Director Comey, what's the risk to law enforcement and to prosecution if, when presented a legal court order, a company refuses to provide the communications that the court has ordered them to? Director Comey. The risk is that we won't be able to make a case and a really bad guy will go free. Chairman Burr. Can you for the American people set a percentage of how much of that is terrorism and how much of this fear is law enforcement and prosecutions that take place in every town in America every day? Director Comey. I'd say this problem we call ``Going Dark,'' which as Director Clapper mentioned is the growing use of encryption both to lock devices when they sit there and to cover communications as they move over fiber optic cables, is actually overwhelmingly affecting law enforcement, because it affects cops and prosecutors and sheriffs and detectives trying to make murder cases, car accident cases, kidnapping cases, drug cases. It has an impact on our national security work, but overwhelmingly this is a problem that local law enforcement sees. Chairman Burr. This would include pornography, and the list goes on and on and on, which I think there would be consensus in America that if that's carried out, that if a court certifies that the reason is there, that a company ought to then produce that information. Is that logical? Director Comey. Yes, especially with respect to devices, phones, that default lock. That is the overwhelming concern of state and local law enforcement, because all of our lives are becoming increasingly digital. Those devices are going to hold the evidence of child pornography, communications that someone made before they were killed, before they went missing, the evidence that will be necessary to solve a crime, and including things like car accidents. So it is a big problem for law enforcement, armed with a search warrant, when you find a device that can't be opened even though the judge said there's probable cause to open it. As I said, it affects our counterterrorism work. San Bernardino, a very important investigation to us; we still have one of those killers' phones that we have not been able to open. It's been over two months now. We're still working on it. But this also occurred on the criminal side. A woman was murdered in Louisiana last summer, eight months pregnant, killed. No clues to who did it, except her phone was there when she's found, killed. They couldn't open it, still can't open it. So the case remains unsolved. So this is something I hear about all over the country from my partners in state and local law enforcement. Chairman Burr. Is it safe to say that if companies were required to honor that court order, that law enforcement and the prosecution element isn't concerned at all at how they access that--that can be proprietary and within each company-- but supplying the information is absolutely crucial to the continuation of that investigation and prosecution? Director Comey. That's one of the aspects of the conversation, which is healthy. There's a robust debate going on and there ought to be because these are important issues. But a part that gets confusing to me is when folks talk like we want access to companies' servers, we want access to their source code. What we would like is a world where people are able to comply with court orders. Lots of companies do. Both people who make phones are able to unlock them when judges order it and people who provide communication services are able to comply with judges' orders. Others can't and therein lies the problem. But it's not about us trying to get a back door, a term that confuses me, frankly. I don't want a door, I don't want a window, I don't want a sliding glass door. I would like people to comply with court orders, and that's the conversation we're trying to have. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Director Comey. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I'd like to ask you a question if I may, subject Libya. How does the CIA assess ISIL's intrusions into Libya? Director Brennan. We see Libya as the most important theater for ISIL outside of the Syria-Iraq theater. They have several thousand members there. They have absorbed some of the groups inside of Libya, including Ansar Al-Sharia, that was very active prior to ISIL's rise. Libya has been a place where this form of extremism and terrorism has grown up over the years. As the borders of the Syria-Iraq area were being tightened down, we know that some of those foreign fighters started to divert into Libya. So Libya has become a magnet for individuals not only inside of Libya, but from the African continent as well as from outside. So it is a real issue, a real problem. But we see ISIL in Libya as a very, very important hub for ISIL activities. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Second question: Assessment on North Korea. We know they possess anywhere from 10 to 20 both uranium and plutonium weapons. We now have seen the recent launch of the Taepodong 2, which my understanding is is capable of reaching the United States. And then there's the KN08. How do you assess the Korean leader's intentions with what he is doing with respect to these tests and the development of both a plutonium and uranium stream of weapons? Director Brennan. I think it's very obvious that Kim Jong Un is trying to demonstrate to the world that he has capability both in terms of the nuclear test as well as ballistic missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, that he wants to showcase as a way to demonstrate his strength, but also as a way to market some of his proliferation capabilities. So it is something that is obviously a key concern to the intelligence community as a whole. It is a priority collection area for us. But the assessment, at least from my perspective, is that he has developed both the nuclear capability as well as developing this ballistic missile capability, mating them together, so that he can demonstrate that he has reach far beyond the Korean Peninsula. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Third question, a little bit more time: How do you assess the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan? How much of the territory of Afghanistan today is controlled by the Taliban? Director Brennan. It's a difficult question to address because a lot of times the Taliban control of certain areas is dynamic and fluid. So they'll go in and take various government and military outposts, seize it, and then pull back. There's large parts of that country that fall under Taliban influence, and we've been working very closely with the Afghan military and security services, intelligence services, to try to concentrate their focus on areas that need to be protected, whether it be critical infrastructure, cities, transit and transportation routes. But, as you well know, the Taliban control a lot of terrain outside of the central government's reach. And Al-Qaeda continues to have a presence, typically inside of the eastern part of Afghanistan. They continue to work with the Taliban as well as with the Haqqanis. Collectively, they present a serious threat to the stability of the Afghan government, as well as to our personnel, U.S. personnel, inside of Afghanistan. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. That's it for now. Thank you. Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, my view is you couldn't have passionate debates in this room without the great work that the men and women of the intelligence community do to preserve our freedom. I just want to start by saying we're very grateful for that. Director Brennan, in 2014 the CIA conducted an unauthorized search of Senate files, including the emails of Senate staff investigating the CIA's use of torture. The CIA Inspector General later stated that the search involved improper agency access to Senate files, and a review board that you appointed concluded that the search resulted in inappropriate access to the committee's work product. You initially denied that search took place, but the reports of both your inspector general and the review board show that this denial was at odds with the facts. After the facts were publicly exposed, the CIA even wrote an apology letter that you did not send. Now, senior officials from the NSA, the FBI, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have all testified that it would be inappropriate for their agencies to secretly search Senate files without external authorization. But we still have not gotten an acknowledgment from you. So I think it would be important--I'd like to hear from you. I'd like to set the record straight that this would never happen again. Would you agree that the CIA's 2014 search of Senate files was improper? Director Brennan. This is the annual threat assessment, is it not? Yes. I think, Senator, as you well know, there were very unique circumstances associated with this whole affair. These were CIA computers, at a CIA-leased facility. It was a CIA network that was shared between Senate staffers conducting that investigation for your report, as well as CIA personnel. When it became quite obvious to CIA personnel that Senate staffers had unauthorized access to an internal draft document of CIA, there was an obligation on the part of CIA officers who had responsibility for the security of that network to investigate to see what might have been the reason for that access that the Senate staffers had to that document. They conducted that investigation. I spoke to the Chairman and Vice Chairman about it. I tried to make sure they understood exactly what the challenge was that we had. We conducted that investigation. I then subsequently referred the matter to the IG when the Senate leadership was concerned about the actions of CIA officers. I also subsequently convened an accountability board. And I think if you were to read those reports, including the accountability board, you would see that it determined that the actions of the CIA were reasonable, given the very unclear and unwritten or unspecific understanding between the committee and CIA at the time in terms of---- Senator Wyden. Mr. Director, my time is short, but that's not what the inspector general or the---- Director Brennan. I respectfully disagree. Senator Wyden [continuing]. Or the review board---- Director Brennan. I respectfully disagree with you, Senator. Senator Wyden. I'd like to read the exact words. The exact words of the review board were: `Ìt resulted in inappropriate access to SSCI work product.'' And your inspector general reached the same conclusion. So the question here is when you're talking about spying on a committee responsible for overseeing your agency, in my view that undermines the very checks and balances that protect our democracy, and it's unacceptable in a free society. And your compatriots in all of the sister agencies agreed with that. Now, you disagree? Director Brennan. Yes. I think you mischaracterized both their comments as well as what's in those reports. And I apologized to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman about the de minimis access and inappropriate access that CIA officers made to five emails or so of Senate staffers during that investigation, and I apologized to them for that very specific inappropriate action that was taken as part of a very reasonable investigative action. But do not say that we spied on Senate computers or your files. We did not do that. We were fulfilling our responsibilities. Senator Wyden. I read the exact words of the inspector general and exact words of the review board. You appointed the review board. They said nobody ought to be punished, but they said there was improper access. My point is, in our system of government we have responsibilities to do vigorous oversight and we can't do vigorous oversight if there are improper procedures used to access our files. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Director Brennan. Senator, I would say, do you not agree that there was improper access that Senate staffers had to CIA internal deliberative documents? Was that not inappropriate, unauthorized? Senator Wyden. I can tell you, having talked at length to our staff, everything that we determined they did was appropriate. But I asked about CIA conduct and two reviews, the inspector general and your review board, said it was improper. Director Brennan. Yes, and I'm still awaiting the review that was done by the Senate to take a look at what the staffers' actions were. Separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches, Senator, goes both ways. As I said, I apologized to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for the very specific inappropriate access that agency officers who were investigating this incident made to those emails, very limited inappropriate actions. Overall, that investigation was done consistent with our obligations, consistent with the law, consistent with our responsibilities. And I do think that you're mischaracterizing the full tenor of both the accountability board and the inspector general's report. Senator Wyden. It's pretty hard to mischaracterize word for word quotes. They used the words `ìmproper access.'' Chairman Burr. I'll exercise something here and recognize Senator Heinrich. Senator Heinrich. I want to start by thanking our panelists for being here and for the continued excellent work that their respective agencies do every day in providing world-class strategic analysis and in keeping our country safe in a world of growing and complex threats that Director Clapper so eloquently laid out twice today. The work done by your agencies is critical and I want to thank the men and women of those agencies who continue to do excellent work. I also want to thank Chairman Burr for holding this hearing. It's been two years since we've had one of these and I hope we don't wait that long next time. I think it's important that the American people have a chance to hear from these officials directly, especially since so many of our actions with these Directors take place behind closed doors. While that's certainly appropriate in most circumstances, a public debate I believe benefits tremendously from transparency, and I appreciate the opportunity today. I want to start with Admiral Rogers. Admiral, as you know, the world has seen a truly alarming increase in attacks on critical infrastructure. For example, in December DHS reported a 20 percent increase in cyber incidents between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. While critical manufacturing was the most targeted sector in that, energy ranked second in the number of incidents, with water and waste water systems coming in third. On top of that, we've seen recent attacks against Turkish banks, Ukrainian and Israeli electricity providers, and it was recently revealed that Iranian hackers infiltrated a dam just north of New York City in 2013. So my question for you is this: Does the IC, particularly NSA, have sufficient insight into the sorts of cyber threats to U.S. critical infrastructure that we're seeing by foreign actors, and what can we do to better position ourselves against those threats specifically to critical infrastructure? Admiral Rogers. You never have all the insight that you would like. I don't think you're going to hear an intel professional tell you, hey, look, I couldn't use more insight. I think the biggest challenge in some ways is not so much the level of insight, but it's how do we generate, take that insight and generate action, and make the changes that I think we all believe are necessary, given the dynamics of the world that you've outlined, that I don't think are short-term trends. I don't see this changing in the near term. I see this as the nature of the world we're living in and we're likely to be living in for some period of time. So the challenge I think is how do we take those insights and generate action. That's the biggest challenge to me. Senator Heinrich. Have you thought about, particularly given the focus of those on things like electrical generation and water and waste water systems, the ramifications of some of the changes within those fields, of distributed approaches and resiliency, as opposed to the very traditional approaches of sort of one-way generation and large-scale transmission? Admiral Rogers. Right. And we're watching most of the sectors in the area trying to go that approach. How can you build redundancy and resiliency, look at fragmentation and duplication? I've talked to several elements in power and water over the course of the last year, and you can see elements within the sectors trying to go that way. But I'd be the first to acknowledge, just given the breadth of infrastructure within our Nation, the amount of time it's going to take to do that across the entire breadth of our Nation, that is not an insignificant challenge. Senator Heinrich. Clearly. Would you agree that some of the movement towards more distributed purchase, particularly within electrical generation, things like microgrids, islandable microgrids, distributed storage, distributed generation, are helpful in mitigating the potential impact of a large-scale attack? Admiral Rogers. Yes. I think that's part of, that should be a fundamental element of, a broader strategy. I just try to remind people, there's no silver bullet, if that makes sense. Senator Heinrich. As a smart Senator said, sometimes there's silver buckshot when you don't have a silver bullet. Director Brennan, while the United States is obviously not addressing the ISIL issue alone in Syria and Iraq, the reality is that many of our foreign partners in the region are at times heavily distracted by unrelated conflicts that are sometimes counterproductive to that fight. For example, as you're well aware, Turkey is targeting the very Kurds who've been some of the most engaged fighters in the battle against ISIS. We have Saudi Arabia pouring money and equipment into the fight in Yemen instead of focusing on ISIL in Syria. You've spent a lot of time in the Middle East over the years. What has the CIA done and what else might be done to get our regional partners more focused on confronting the threat posed by ISIL? Director Brennan. As you point out, Senator, the Middle East right now I think is racked by more instability and violence and inter-state conflict than we have seen certainly in the past 50 years. The amount of bloodshed and the humanitarian suffering is I think unprecedented. We, CIA, work very closely with our partners throughout the region trying to make sure that those intelligence and security services are fulfilling their responsibilities professionally as far as making sure that we can share information with them about the flow of foreign fighters in particular, given that there is such transit between and among these countries of individuals who might go to Syria, Iraq, and then down to Libya or Egypt. We're trying to make sure we give them the intelligence they need, give them the training they need, but also give them the professional training that is required, because there are tremendous obligations on them to make sure that they are able to carry out their responsibilities while at the same time respect the human rights obligations that they have as security services. So what we're trying to do is to serve as an interlocutor with many of them and to see whether or not we can enhance their relationships. Sometimes not only do we have inter-state conflicts, but we have sort of intramural conflicts among some of these countries, which then extends to the services. So I think building up these intelligence and security services, giving them the wherewithal to address the problems, but again making sure that they carry out their responsibilities professionally, is very important. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Heinrich. The Chair would also make a note that the Senator is correct, we didn't have an open threats hearing last year. We had a closed one. But last year we had open hearings with Admiral Rogers from the NSA, Director Rasmussen from the NCTC, Director Comey from the FBI. And we had an open hearing scheduled for Director Brennan and were blitzed by a snowstorm. Maybe had we had him in he wouldn't have fallen and wrecked his knee. It is the intent of the Chair to continue to allow every agency the opportunity, not just to be here for a worldwide threat hearing, but to come in and share with the American people what it is they do, why they do it, but, more importantly, why the American people should care about their success. Today is drinking out of a fire hose, trying to address the entire globe at one time. The rest of it I think is going to be more constructive. So I think the committee has attempted to try to increase the amount of open exposure with a degree of specificity that we haven't had in the past. With that, Senator Coats. Senator Coats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, I note here on the very first page of the statement for the record you say: ``The order of topics presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate the relative importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of the intelligence community.'' My question is, is this because we are dealing with such a complex and ever-expanding level of threats and it's difficult to prioritize, or is it because maybe we ought to be talking about this in Thursday's closed session? If that's the case, please tell me. But if you had to prioritize--you know, we have to make decisions here. We have limitations. You have budget limitations. We want to try to address all these threats equally, but that's not possible. So it seems to me that as a committee member and as a member of Congress we need to know how to best allocate our budgets toward what you need. I know that this can be ever-changing, but what's your response to that and how should we best address this? Director Clapper. Well, the more time I've spent doing this, I think the more loath I've become to try to rank-order threats, because any of them can leap up and bite us. So we don't have the luxury of--I don't like to mislead people that, well, this one threat is the one that we're going to focus on at the expense of others. So that's why the statement there. What does that mean from a resource standpoint in terms of what funding and resources we're given to do our job? I think the approach that we've taken, at least what I've tried to champion in the five and a half years I've been the DNI, is those resources that enable resilience and agility, so that we can respond and, hopefully, anticipate and then respond to a variety of threats. That's one thing--I said this before in answer to a question this morning. Again, in my time in the intelligence business I don't recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it's the nation- state threat posed by Russia and China, and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation-states of the likes of ISIL, Al-Qaeda, etc. So all these threats are serious, be it terrorism, be it weapons of mass destruction, or be it cyber. Others may have a view here. John. Director Brennan. As it was pointed out, we're facing this array of threats. The one area that I'm very concerned about is the increasing concerns about vulnerabilities in that digital domain and cyber. I do think we as a country need to make sure that we understand what those vulnerabilities are. Then, I think to Jim Comey's and others' points, making sure that we understand that the intelligence and security services and law enforcement services of this country have a role to help protect that environment, because our way of life, our future, really depends on making sure that that is strong. And we have adversaries overseas, both nation-states as well as sub- national actors, that have the potential and the capability to carry out attacks. Director Clapper. The other part of this, if I may, just a thought that John keyed here, is the admixture, the combination of the threats posed to us in the cyber domain and the connection of that with terrorism. That makes ranking these discrete threats kind of difficult. Senator Coats. Maybe that's why you have cyber technology as number one. I just assume that, and I appreciate the response on that. Admiral Rogers, I'd like you to comment on that also, because this is your domain. Where do we stand on that? Admiral Rogers. For me, like my counterparts on the panel, I tell our team I am always leery about this hierarchical approach to doing business, because I've watched it encourage a workforce to think very linearly, so we focus on number one, then we think about number two, then we think about number three. And the world around us just doesn't work that way. For me, the way I try to bin it with our team is protection of U.S. persons and U.S. infrastructure is priority number one. And I look at this and I see cyber- and the counterterrorism world in particular bringing those together in a very concerning way, as you heard from Director Clapper in his opening statement, and cyber remains so foundational to every aspect of our daily lives, just in a way that we haven't necessarily seen as much in the past. It represents both great opportunity for us as a society, but great vulnerability, with the potential for great impact. That's what's of concern. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Coats. Senator King. Senator King. To follow up that, on that point, I was a governor during September 11th, and shortly afterwards we tasked our state police to go to all of what we thought were the vulnerable pieces of infrastructure in our state, electrical, chemical plants, and those kind of things, and assess their level of vulnerability and to in effect red team them about how they could the attacked. Do we do that with our critical infrastructure? There's a lot of talk here about legislation, but it seems to me you could create a team to go to our power grid, to go to our water and gas utilities, financial services, and say: Look, this is what could happen to you; have you thought about this? You don't really need legislation to do this. In other words, more proactive, trying to alert them to the risks and to alert them to some of the protections that may be available. Admiral Rogers. Now you're really talking outside my lane as the Director of NSA and more in the lane of the Department of Homeland Security, so I will not speak for Secretary Johnson. I share your concern. It's one reason why, speaking within my lane within DOD, for example, we do just that. We aggressively attempt to make sure we understand our structures, their importance to our ability to execute their mission, our mission, and then their vulnerability. So we do penetration testing. We do red teams. We do no- notice inspections, for example, as a way to make sure---- Senator King. It seems to me we ought--and perhaps we ought to have Jeh Johnson here. But we need to be talking about being more active and not just wait and hope they are doing the proper defensive measures, but to alert them to where they're vulnerable and to help them figure out the defensive measures. Let me change the subject for a moment to heroin, which is an absolute epidemic. 10 or 12,000 people a year now dying. The number's accelerating just astoundingly and tragically. Director Clapper talked about Mexico and that's where it seems to be coming from. A specific question. One of the problems with heroin that we're now seeing is it's often laced with fentanyl, which makes it more potent and more dangerous. Where does that come from? Do we know? Do we have intelligence on where the fentanyl is coming from, where it's being manufactured, how it gets into this unfortunate stream? Director Comey. Director Comey. Senator, I know there's a lot of work being done on that. We have a pretty good sense that a fair amount of it is being manufactured in China, but it's also being manufactured in other places in the developing world. So I know DEA and FBI and the rest of the intelligence community is spending a lot of time trying to understand where those sources are. Senator King. Well, I think we should know that and it should be publicity and we should name and shame those companies--those countries, because this is entirely unacceptable. It's a trade in death. I would hope that there would be further analysis of that, and also analysis of the trade stream that allows it to get to Mexico or Central America. Second question: Do we have adequate resources in terms of intelligence, but also in terms of interdiction, in Mexico and Central America? My understanding is we have a pretty small number of people in some of those Central American countries which also are contributing to this. Do you feel as the intelligence community that you have adequate resources to this trade, where it comes from, who's behind it? Then of course that leads into interdiction. I'll follow up with that. Mr. Comey, your thoughts? Director Comey. Surely not, given the size of the tidal wave of heroin that's washing over from Mexico. And there's two waves. We talk a lot about the heroin wave, for good reason. There's another wave washing over the western United States that's methamphetamine from Mexico, and the two waves are actually now crashing together in the middle of the United States. So surely not is the honest answer. We have built, I think as Director Clapper said, much more effective relationships among ourselves in focusing on that problem and with our partners in Mexico and Central America. But honestly, it's not good enough, given the size of the threat. Senator King. Another question is, how's it getting in? Do we know how much by land and how much by water? My understanding is a great deal of this is coming by water and one of the problems is a lack of adequate interdiction resources, both in terms of the military and the Coast Guard. Director Comey. A large amount of it comes by water, and it tends to switch from both sides of the Central American land mass, Pacific or Atlantic side. But to pick up on what General Clapper said, what I've heard from the Coast Guard especially is they have a lack of resources to interdict. But also a lot of it comes by land, tunnels, smugglers, trucks. Because it's a tidal wave, it's washing in a lot of different ways. Senator King. A tidal wave of death is what we're talking about. I appreciate your efforts, but I think we have to realize that this is something that's really exploded almost literally in the last three or four years and we have to react to it proportionate to the threat to our people. This is killing people right now in the United States, in every state. It's not an abstract concern. It's not a possible virus. It's something that's happening right now. So I commend you for your efforts, but I hope that this is something where the community can work together to develop the information necessary, but then we can also--it's got to be all of government to react to take the information and act upon it. Thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, I suspect that this may be your last public global threat hearing before our committee. So let me join with our colleagues in thanking you for your decades of service. You and I first met in 2004 when Joe Lieberman and I wrote the law that created the DNI Office and I take special pride in the work that you're doing and want to thank you for all of your years of service. Director Clapper. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Let me follow up on the questions that my colleague from Maine just posed. Is there actionable intelligence that would allow us to disrupt and interdict more of the heroin and fentanyl-laced heroin that is coming in from Mexico than we are able to act on because of operational constraints? Director Clapper. Well, I just discussed this morning before the Senate Armed Services Committee the testimony that General Kelly, former, recently retired as the commander of Southern Command. I heard him say on more than one occasion that they had a lot of good intelligence on drug flow into the United States and he was limited because of his lack of operational resources to react. Now, that is getting better. Again, a plug for the Coast Guard: They do magnificent work. These new cutters that they're building and deploying are a fantastic capability, ideally suited for this interdiction mission, particularly with the seaborne and specifically the semi-submersible vehicles that the druggies are using to ship large quantities. When those are caught at sea, you take a lot of drugs off the street. Senator Collins. Thank you. Director Comey, you talked earlier about encryption and how difficult it is making the job of both law enforcement and our efforts to prevent and detect terrorist plots. In fact, you have been quoted as saying that encryption is at the center of the terrorist tradecraft. Yet the administration has not submitted to date any legislative proposal to deal with encryption. I would like to know whether you--and I'm going to ask General Clapper and Director Brennan the same question--have any of the three made recommendations to the President that he submit legislation dealing with the encryption problem to Congress for our consideration? Director Comey. I'll go first. Thank you, Senator. I would never--I don't think it would be appropriate for me to share recommendations that I might have made within the Executive Branch. But I will tell you this. Encryption is a problem in our investigations. It is also a great thing. And therein lies the challenge, which is why this is such a hard problem. That's why the administration and the private sector have been struggling so much. I am optimistic that we'll make progress through our conversations, but I don't know whether that'll get us far enough. So I can't quite clearly see what the future looks like from here, but I'm just not comfortable talking about the deliberations inside. Senator Collins. Well, let me change the question then. Do you believe that we should pass legislation that deals with encryption? Director Comey. I'm going to have to dodge that because that's not the FBI's job, to make recommendations. I do think that Congress and the American people have to grapple with this, because there's a collision between something that is great, encryption, and something that's also great, which is public safety. Senator Collins. General Clapper, you're retiring at the end of the year, so you don't have to be careful in answering this question in any way. Director Clapper. Well, I'm not sure we've exhausted all the possibilities here technologically. I'm not an IT expert by any means. I would hope that we have not yet exhausted what could be done voluntarily. As Director Comey indicated, encryption is a good thing for all kinds of reasons, for security and privacy and all that. But at the same time, it enables--it is enabling nefarious activity of all sorts, whether it's law enforcement or in the national security arena, to go on, and we're losing information because of it. So my hope is that the technological solution, we haven't fully explored the potential there. I'd also ask Admiral Rogers to comment as well. Admiral Rogers. Encryption is foundational to the future. Anyone who thinks we're just going to walk away from that I think is totally unrealistic. The challenge becomes to me, given that premise that encryption is foundational to the future, what's the best way for us to meet both of these imperatives, to ensure the privacy and the rights of our citizens and to ensure their protection and safety? Both are incredibly important to us as a Nation. The challenge that I've seen in the discussion to date is, from Mike Rogers' perspective, we're spending a lot of time talking about what we can't do, and I keep thinking to myself: We are the most innovative, technologically advanced Nation in the world; let's start thinking about what can we do. Let's start trying to figure out how are we going to make this work. Senator Collins. Thank you. Chairman Burr. Senator Hirono. Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, thank you very much for noting--well, first of all for your service, and to all of you on the panel. Thank you for noting that the drug threat is ever growing in our country and that, while interdiction and enforcement are very important challenges to us, I suspect that we are not putting very many resources into the prevention side of the drug equation. That's just a comment. Moving on, as North Korea continues its nuclear weapons and missile programs, do you assess that locating missile defense systems closer to North Korea or locating another carrier, say in Yokosuka, Japan, could provide greater deterrence against North Korean aggression? And I welcome comments also from Lieutenant General--General Stewart, and anyone else on the panel who'd like to comment. Director Clapper. Well, that's a policy call. But, having said that, I think it would. I think even the discussion about missile defense certainly gets the Chinese' attention. They would prefer that THAAD, for example, not be deployed. But the North Koreans are making it hard, I think, for the Chinese to sustain that position. So to the extent that there are force displays, force presence, missile defense, I think that could possibly have a deterrent effect on the North Koreans, but it could also incite them to do more. Senator Hirono. And with Kim Jong Un it's hard to tell which way he would go. That's just an editorial comment. In your statement of record you note that we will monitor compliance with China's September 2015 commitment to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantage to companies or commercial sectors. Private security experts have identified limited ongoing cyber activity from China, but have not verified state sponsorship or the use of exfiltrated data for commercial gain. So, Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, I understand that there's much that we can't discuss in this open forum, but can you help me understand how the September 15th U.S.-China cyber agreement is helpful when we can't effectively monitor compliance? Director Clapper. Well, I think I'll ask Admiral Rogers to back me up here, but I think that there has been a decline, but I think we're going to have to have some more time to assess whether this is a case where these state sponsors, those elements, cyber actors, that are under the control of the state, have actually reduced their activity or they were told: Don't get caught. I think we're going to need some more time to assess that. Of course, there's also the challenge of determining whether, per the agreement, that any information that is purloined is actually used for economic advantage or not. Mike, do you want to add to that? Admiral Rogers. No, I would agree, and I don't think there's any doubt that we have been able to show in the past cases where that was the case. I think that's in part what led to the desire to be very direct with our Chinese counterparts to say this behavior is unacceptable and we have to work our way through this, because the status quo, the use of the powers of the state to generate economic advantage through cyber as a tool, is not acceptable to us. I think that's what drove the discussions in September and, as the DNI has said, our view to date is we have seen some lessening in activity, but we're not yet prepared to say that's as a result of a systematic policy choice on the part of our Chinese counterparts. Senator Hirono. Because it's so hard to determine attribution in the cyber threat arena, do you believe that we'll ever be able to resolve this dilemma? I'd ask you two gentlemen to respond. Then, General Stewart, would you care to comment on my first question regarding the assessment question that I had? General Stewart. I think North Korea has a number of objectives, one of which is demonstrating strength against the U.S. and its allies. The second objective is to deter U.S. actions if they take unilateral actions on the Korean Peninsula. And third among the objectives is to separate the U.S. from its South Korean ally. So the things that we can do that will show that we still have strength, that we will not be deterred, that we will not be separated from our ally, will be very beneficial. However, Kim Jong Un is unpredictable, and therefore I think we should do all those things to maintain our relationship, show strength, show that we cannot be deterred from taking action, but he is still an unpredictable wild card that none of us know how he will react. Senator Hirono. Some of our force structure decisions, though, would also have an impact on China, which is a more I think reasonable actor. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but could the other two gentlemen answer briefly the question? Chairman Burr. They can, briefly. Admiral Rogers. You never have perfect knowledge. We historically have been able to put together a fairly good picture. I'm not going to argue that it's perfect. I'm the first to acknowledge it's getting harder, not easier, because we're watching opponents spending a lot of time trying to hurt or diminish our ability to attribute specific activity to specific actors. Senator Hirono. Did you want to add to that? Director Clapper. No. Senator Hirono. Thank you. It's going to be a challenge. Chairman Burr. The correct answer. [Laughter.] Senator Hirono. Thank you. Chairman Burr. Senator Warner. Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start with thanking again all of you for your service and, equally important, the literally thousands of men and women who work to keep our country safe. Let me say at the outset, as a Virginia Senator, the fact that we have the offices of ODNI, CIA, NRO, NGO, NGA, and a series of other entities, and, Director Comey, if GSA makes the right decision, maybe the FBI as well--and Senator Mikulski's not here--I hope you will relay that message that we give you the credit, and obviously the men and women, the professionals, don't get the credit that they appropriately deserve. Director Clapper, I'm going to--a couple questions for you. First of all, I want to commend you in terms of your testimony today, the fact that you've listed cyber and what I would call digital security first, and the recognition that, while we're talking somewhat about encryption today, and I'm going to come back to that in a moment, that we need forward-leaning thinking about the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence and virtual reality, and the fact of the matter that foreign data science is moving ahead very rapidly and tools and challenges around issues like encryption and going dark--this genie's out of the bottle. I particularly commend both Admiral Rogers and Director Comey's comments. People who want to relitigate the origination of encryption, that issue is behind us. I think it's appropriate to point out that when our national security is threatened also in terms of intellectual capital, personal information, other kinds of intrusions, encryption--and I particularly appreciate, Director Comey, your comments as well--is both an asset and potentially a liability. I fear that sometimes we have focused just on this piece rather than the whole encompassing issue around digital security. Admiral Rogers, again I want to give you kudos for this notion around innovation. Director Clapper, I guess what my concern is is that sometimes, with all of these competing interests, with national security interests, with intellectual capital security interests, with civil liberties security, with American business security, that I'm not sure all of these competing interests, while there have been efforts, have actually all come together in a thoughtful, reflective way to try to challenge folks around American innovation about how we get this back. I think there needs to be a real debate between all of these communities--the tech community, American business, information security specialists, law enforcement, intel, advocates for privacy and civil liberties. Director Clapper, I'd like to see, if we had such kind of a thoughtful approach would that be of value to this debate, which has already proved to be quite contentious? Director Clapper. It certainly would. I think--and I think you've named most of the key constituencies here. There are many countervailing interests. There is the pull of the needs for national security and law enforcement that you've heard. There are the privacy and civil liberties concerns and our own security. So there are a myriad or a welter of countervailing interests here that are at play. We certainly, we try to sort our way through all those competing equities. It's a very, very complex issue, as I think you've heard from the discussion that's transpired so far. Senator Warner. Well, I just would say that, as somebody who spent 20-plus years, 25-plus years, in the telecom industry, I don't think it is totally equivalent. And the notion of a kind of top-down solution, which might give us a static solution for a short period of time, but this is going to be a constantly evolving challenge and the response is going to need to be flexible and constantly transitioning. Again, as you lay out some of the challenges, we're talking about a piece here on encryption, but digital security is a much broader issue. I think you've appropriately laid out some of the buckets that have to be part of this, this conversation. My time is running out. I just want to add a subject that the Chair and the Vice Chair have been very helpful on as we think about on overhead, on our satellite issues. I recently was out at NGA, had a very good session there on commercial satellites. Right now the United States, not governmental, has about 50 commercial satellites. One company alone is going to go to 250 this year. I guess, Director Clapper--I know your background here--would you spend a moment in terms of how commercial is going to fit in with our overall overhead needs? Director Clapper. Well, I think commercial imagery, I have been a huge proponent of it since I served as the Director of NIMA-NGA right after 9-11 as a crucial part of our overall architecture. It's also important, though, I think, that these commercial entities remain commercially viable. If they have a product or service that we can use, we should take advantage of that from the standpoint of additional coverage, what is it we can unload from our NTM complex, which I think we'll always have a need for; and also importantly, for resiliency. But what I don't think is a good thing is if they become completely dependent on the government. So we have to find the balance there, and that's why I would like to make a change in the architectural responsibility so that that is accounted for in the totality of our overhead reconnaissance constellation. Senator Warner. Thank you. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Blunt. Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. General Clapper, all of you who represent the IC community and the people you work with and the people that work for us, thank you for what you do. I'm going to mention a couple of questions I'm not going to ask, one for the record. But you just mentioned your leadership at NGA, the geospatial efforts we have. I've been spending a lot of time lately with Director Cardillo and in those discussions we've been talking a lot about sort of the workforce of the future. So one thing I'm going to ask in a question for all of you that we don't have time to ask today is: With engineering, with technology, with science, with math, are we doing the kinds of things we need to do and what can we do earlier to identify people we want to get on that track of being able to do these jobs in the IC community generally, Admiral Rogers, in your field specifically? Some information on that would be helpful. I'm also going to not ask a question--I will ask that question for the record. With regard to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines, what are we doing to identify and nurture STEM talent earlier and attract those people to the IC in general, and to the NSA in particular? I won't ask today about Robert Levinson. I think that's probably more appropriately asked in a closed setting, and I'll be doing that later. But in that regard, I am concerned that the transfer of money occurred when it did. A supposed $400 million from a past military sale that we had had happened to be given back just coincidentally the same time that those three hostages, as I see them, were released. Now, this is money, by the way, that the Congress in 2000 said had to go to victims of Iranian-backed terror and it all did. So this is clearly giving the money away twice, sort of like the meeting of the church business meeting where they say: We've got a real problem. We've got a $1,000 deficit. What should we do? And somebody says: Well, let's give half of it to the PTA and half of it to the Girl Scouts. This money was gone, but it was an excuse, a coincidental excuse I think, to do the right thing in the wrong way. But what I want to ask you is, you said, Secretary Kerry said, just in the last few days that undoubtedly some of the money returned to Iran would go to terrorist groups. You verified again today that you see no real change in behavior in this number one sponsor, state sponsor of terror in the world. Are we doing any analysis? And anybody that wants to answer this can. What do we think happens when suddenly Iran gets $100 million, $100 billion, or maybe they get half of that? Maybe they get $50 billion. What do we think happens in places where not very much money can drive a lot of bad activity? $400 million in Yemen can make lots of bad things happen. Are we evaluating what happens when Hezbollah, when the Taliban, when the Houthi get this new infusion of money that I think everybody understands they are about to get? Director Clapper. Well, Senator Blunt, I'm a little constrained here in what can be said about this publicly. But we are watching to the best of our ability the insight we have on actually where this money is going. Most of it so far has been taken up with what I would call encumbrances, in other words do-outs, loans, and other needs that Iran has. Those fall mainly in the economic arena. They need to recapitalize their whole oil infrastructure, which has deteriorated, if they're going to do something with that. They have a lot of obligations in debts that they need to pay. So the actual--we can go into this in more detail in a classified setting, but what has actually flowed to the Quds Force, let's say, has not been very much. And bear in mind that even during the period of heavy sanctions the Quds Force, the IRGC, the Republican Guards, and the Quds Force specifically, were--they were funded and the Iranians found a way to sustain them. And of course, they themselves have business interests by which they generate their own income. Senator Blunt. I think that last point is the best point. Even when Iran didn't have whatever amount of this money they get--say they get a tenth of the purported $100 billion. Even when they didn't have money, they were able to fund terrorism. I think whatever percentage of that money comes back to them, the argument we sometimes hear that, well, they'll build schools and hospitals and pay debts--they could have done all those things before they got this money as well, and they still found money to finance terror efforts all over the neighborhood that they're in and outside that neighborhood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Blunt. Senator Cotton. Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here. We frequently get to talk in private, not often in public. So let me associate myself with the comments of so many other members of this committee in thanking you, not only for your service--Director Clapper in particular for your many years of long service--for the service of the men and women that you represent. Director Brennan, you stated earlier, in response to Senator Heinrich, we have not seen as much violence, instability, and interstate conflict in the Middle East in, I believe the time period was, your lifetime? Director Brennan. I think I said 50 years, which is less than my lifetime. Senator Cotton. Why do you think that is? What are the key drivers that's causing all that? Director Brennan. Well, I think it's been five years now since the Arab Spring started to take root, which had a very traumatic impact on governments throughout the region, and the street became alive. And Al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations did not trigger that, but they have taken full advantage of it. So the instability that we see in Libya and Yemen and Syria certainly was an outgrowth of the Arab Spring and the turnover in governments in Libya and Yemen. So this is pitting individuals from different areas of the country, of ethnic backgrounds that might be different than the government's. There are sectarian tensions that are playing out. All these things that were repressed because of the authoritarian governments that were in power for many years, and once their control was shaken I think it then loosed this popular reaction that now is finding expression in basically civil war, sectarian conflict, and challenges against the government. A lot of these governments do not have the political institutions, nor the ability to address the many, many challenges, political, economic, and social in the region. Finally, as you well know, a lot of these countries were carved out of previous colonial realms and therefore were almost patchworks of people of various backgrounds, that now are finding ways to fight among themselves. Senator Cotton. Thank you. Director Comey, I want to address electronic communication transaction records. I've introduced legislation to rectify a problem commonly known as the `ÈCTR fix.'' The legislation would clarify the government can obtain specified sets of electronic communication transaction records and fix an oversight made in an earlier law. What's your position and what is the position of the FBI on the need for this fix? Director Comey. We need it very much, and it's actually quite an ordinary fix. It's necessary because of what I believe is a typo in the 1993 statute that has led to some companies interpreting it in a way I don't believe Congress ever intended. So it is ordinary, but it affects our work in a very, very big and practical way. Senator Cotton. Would you characterize that as a top legislative priority for the FBI? Director Comey. Yes. Senator Cotton. Thank you. General Stewart, I want to turn to North Korea's recent nuclear test. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization has not reported any collection of xenon or other nuclear particulates. Are you aware of any nuclear particulates collected from the test? General Stewart. Thank you for letting me participate. [Laughter.] I have 10 questions I'd like to answer and that's not one of them. But I appreciate the opportunity. We have not at this point detected any particulates that would characterize this device. Senator Cotton. What does that tell us then about North Korean containment vessels and technology? General Stewart. Very robust capability to deceive, contain, hide their full capability and capacity. And I'd like to talk about this some more in closed hearing about both our capability and what we're seeing that they're doing. Senator Cotton. Thank you. I believe we'll have a chance to do that soon. Director Brennan, I want to return in closing here to your exchange with Senator Wyden. You mentioned the removal of a CIA document from the shared space in violation of a memorandum of understanding with this committee. Has any of this committee or staffer ever apologized to you for the removal of that document? Director Brennan. No, Senator. Senator Cotton. Do you believe that that was a violation of the MOU that the agency and this committee had? Director Brennan. I believe it was inconsistent with the understanding that we had, the common understanding, yes. Senator Cotton. Has that document been returned to you? Director Brennan. I will have to check on that, Senator. Senator Cotton. Handling of classified information is a very serious matter, right? Director Brennan. Yes. Senator Cotton. Thank you. Chairman Burr. I thank all Senators. We're going to have a second round. It's going to start in the same order as the first one. The second round will consist of one question or two minutes, whichever happens fastest. And it's my intent that we will be out of here shortly. Again, I thank our witnesses. General Stewart, you were recognized too soon, because I have a question for you. I'm not sure it's in the 10 questions that you would like to answer. Assessing where we are today in Iraq: Share with me what Iraq looks like at the end of this year as it relates to being different, if at all? General Stewart. The Kurds in northern Iraq solidify their positions. They probably won't move any further south because it's not in their interest to move south. The Shia militia retains control over the central part of Iraq, moving out west just a bit. We consolidate our gains in Ramadi. The Sunni forces and Iraqi forces consolidate their gains in Ramadi, begin to move in to secure the corridors moving from Hit up to Haditha, possibly isolating, beginning the isolation effort around Mosul. But in the western part of Iraq I'm not optimistic that we will have done much to move ISIL forces out of that region. Chairman Burr. And doubtful that Mosul will change hands in this calendar year? General Stewart. I am not betting on that, Senator. Chairman Burr. Thank you, General. General Stewart. I think it'll be very difficult to both isolate and conduct a clearing operation that would look like the securing of Mosul this year. Chairman Burr. Thank you, General Stewart. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Director Comey, I want to thank you. You really are a man of principle and you stand up for what you believe, and it's very much appreciated. Last year, I think some of us received a report from the FBI in March of 2015 that showed that individuals on the FBI terrorist watch list attempted over a 10-year period to buy a gun or explosive over 2,000 times and they were successful 91 percent of the time. Could you describe the standard used by the FBI to make sure that only individuals who pose a threat to national security are placed on the FBI's terrorist screening database? Director Comey. Thank you, Senator. I'll try and do it briefly. There's an extensive process to vet the information around an individual to see if they meet our threshold, which I think is reason to believe--reasonable basis to believe they're involved in terrorist activity, to then put them on the watch list. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Can you describe here the safeguards to ensure that the FBI minimizes false positives? That means making sure that innocent Americans aren't placed on the terrorist screening database? Director Comey. Probably in two directions. One from our own direction is a constant effort to make sure our records are accurate, because false positives simply waste our resources. Then from the other direction, in the last year the Department of Justice has driven the creation of a redress procedure. So if anyone thinks they were wrongly placed on the list, there's a process through which they can challenge that. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Mr. Brennan, I want to go back to Afghanistan for a minute. Talk a little bit about Al-Qaeda's presence in the country and whether it's increasing or not, and ISIL's influence in the country. And how probable is the emergence of an ISIL stronghold in Afghanistan? Director Brennan. Al-Qaeda, there's probably about maybe 100 or so, somewhere in that area, of Al-Qaeda members in the eastern part of Afghanistan. The leader there is an individual by the name of Farouq Al-Qatari, and they have married up, as I said, with some of the other militant organizations in the area, including the Taliban. So they continue to ply their trade on the ground inside of Afghanistan. But we're concerned they can regenerate in that Afghan-Pak border region, which is why we need to maintain the intelligence collection, as well as working with our Afghan and Pak partners. ISIL has been able to take advantage of some elements within the Taliban that have been disenchanted with the organization. So ISIL is seen as a threat, certainly by Afghan officials. When I traveled over to Afghanistan just two months ago, it was one of the real concerns they had that ISIL is planting the flag in different parts of Afghanistan and they are now seen as a competer, a competitor, to some of the existing militant and terrorist organizations there. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Stop there. How do you assess that? Director Brennan. We assess it based on our---- Vice Chairman Feinstein. No, no, not the methodology. But in the vernacular, how big a deal is that? Director Brennan. It's a concern. ISIL probably has several hundred members or so inside of Afghanistan, I would estimate. And it is distributed. They have had some setbacks there as they have gone up against some of the other militant organizations. But it is a concern. Just like we see these various franchises growing in places like Indonesia or Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, we see the same thing in South Asia. Vice Chairman Feinstein. Some time ago we did a four- corners intelligence trip that went to Afghanistan and I had the privilege of spending some time with women parliamentarians. I was amazed at their strength and the fact that they were going to survive and the Taliban was not going to come back. Now, as I watch the developments happening there, the worry goes up and up and up, and you see these terrible things being done to women again, and also school children who happen to be girls. I wonder whether we can make sufficient progress in the next decade or so. Do you have any assessment on that? Director Brennan. As you point out, I think the Afghan people are a very resilient people. There have been thousands of Afghans who have given their lives for the future of that country. That's why we want to continue to work very closely with them, their intelligence, security, military organizations that are there. They face a host of challenges. Foreign assistance is critically important both on the military front as well as on the economic side. But President Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, they need to make sure that their government is able to address the concerns of the Afghan people across the broad range of areas. But as you point out, the Afghan people are some of the bravest people that we have---- Chairman Burr. As the Vice Chair has worked five questions into the one-question round, I don't question the strength of women. I can assure you of that. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not incur the wrath of the Chairman. I will stick to one. Director Clapper, I wanted to ask you a question about encryption. I'm not sure you're familiar with the report. Maybe already got it. It's brand new, written by an independent group. It's on encryption and the title of it is ``Don't Panic.'' Matt Olsen, who we all have enormous respect for, was very involved, the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. I'm struck by this because I think when you get into the nuts and bolts of it, obviously encryption is available all around the world, often very cheaply. The basic thesis in this report is that, with wireless connectivity and sensors and the like, there are going to be more opportunities to prevent our country from going dark. My question to you would be: Because of Matt Olsen's involvement and the experts involved in this, I would like to have your team take a look at this report and give us an analysis within an agreed-upon time, maybe 60 days. I would ideally like an unclassified version. Maybe if it has a classified annex that would be fine. Would that be something you could agree today? I think this is really a breakthrough report in my view, given the cross section of experts involved. Is that something that you could do for us? Director Clapper. Sure, we'll do that. Senator Wyden. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you. I have one quick comment and one question. Director Clapper, there's been a lot of praise heaped upon you today. I'd like to join in that. In my study of American history, the more I read the more I appreciate Washington, not for necessarily the war and the presiding over the Constitutional Convention, but his role as the first President, establishing precedents and sort of how this whole enterprise would function. I realize you're not the first Director of National Intelligence, but I think by your tenure and your character and your intelligence and your experience you have served a similar function in really establishing how this entity should operate and will operate in the future. For that I want to profoundly compliment and thank you. I think you've helped to create an institution that will serve this country well for some period of time. That's my comment. My question is a very broad one and I don't think it's one that we can answer here today. You comment in your report that Sunni violent extremism has been on an upward trajectory since the seventies. More groups have more safe havens than in any other time in history. We've killed 20,000 members of ISIS and yet we now know that more than 36,000 foreign fighters have gone to join ISIS. The point is we're dealing with a hydra here, where we cut off one head and two grow back. I wonder if it isn't time to stop and say, do we need a new strategy other than trying to just kill our enemies as they arise? I'm thinking of George Kennan and the strategy of containment, not saying that that's the right strategy, but that there was a sort of comprehensive strategy rather than an ad hoc dealing with each individual attack or crisis. I would just suggest that it seems to me this would be a role maybe at the end of this administration or the beginning of the next administration, to think about how do we deal with Sunni extremism and how do we develop a strategy that involves other countries, particularly Sunni countries, that can try to get at the roots of this instead of just the tactics. Your thoughts? Director Clapper. Senator King, I think you've hit on a very important, very crucial point. By the time you get into our business, where we're trying to track down terrorists who are bent on doing harm to us, it's way late. What really needs to be focused on are what are the fundamental systemic conditions that give rise to this? You can kind of rattle off: large ungoverned spaces, a place awash in weapons, the population bulge of young, unemployed and frustrated males to whom such propaganda appeals. What has to be gotten at fundamentally while we're doing our thing of collecting intelligence and taking people off the battlefield is what are the root causes that give rise to this phenomenon of extreme jihadism. Senator King. Thank you. I hope this discussion can continue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Cotton. Senator Cotton. Is it one question or two minutes, whichever is longer? Chairman Burr. Whichever comes first. Senator Cotton. Can I take the Vice Chair? Vice Chairman Feinstein. Oh, you get no sympathy from me. Senator Cotton. I had a long series of adversarial, prosecutorial questions for each of you that I now can't ask since I'll be stopped after the first one. Admiral Rogers, I will address briefly Section 702 of FISA, which expires, if I'm not mistaken, at the end of next year. Section 702 authorizes the government to target non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the U.S. for purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence information. I believe that Section 702 is a vital national security tool. It's constitutional. It has multiple layers of oversight. In 2012 DNI Clapper wrote to Congress requesting a straight reauthorization of Title 7, which would include 702. Do you believe that Congress should pass a straight reauthorization of Section 702? Admiral Rogers. I do believe we need to continue 702. Senator Cotton. Thank you. I converted a long series of adversarial questions into a speech and then asked if you agreed with my speech. Chairman Burr. I will follow up the line of questioning just to say this, that the committee will take up 702 very quickly, not from the standpoint of the legislation, but from the standpoint of the preparation that we need to do in educating and having Admiral Rogers and others bring us up to speed on the usefulness and any tweaks that might have to be made. But I daresay this is something that I think Director Clapper has said before. We cannot do without this. This is absolutely crucial. It's been at the centerpiece of a lot of things. If I could before we end go back to encryption since it was brought up. I've had more district attorneys come to me about the encryption issue than I have the individuals at this table. The district attorneys have come to me because they're beginning to get to a situation where they can't prosecute cases. This is town by town, city by city, county by county, and state by state. It ranges from Cy Vance in New York to a rural town of 2,000 in North Carolina. It's something we need to take seriously. One of the responsibilities of this committee is to make sure those of you at the table and those that complete the complement of our intelligence community have the tools through how we authorize that you need. The traditional tools I see as no different than I look at encryption and say we need to provide a tool for you to have the access to that information when the courts give you permission to do it. I could care less how that's accomplished. It is I think the priority--and I think I can speak for the Vice Chairman. It is the priority of both of us that this be voluntary. But if in fact it's not something we can achieve the balance on voluntarily, then I feel like it's the committee's responsibility to pursue it in any fashion we can, and I intend personally--I won't commit the committee to do it--to pursue that, because I think it is invaluable in the future. I fear that this is not the toughest decision we're going to make, based upon how technology might impact the world we're in. The American people expect us, Director Comey, to this year exceed 72 individuals that you incarcerate before they commit a lone wolf event. You're on track to probably do that, based upon the beginning of this year and based upon intent. I'm not sure that we can turn around and say, well, we only got 11 of them because we couldn't see inside the communications of the other 60-some and, America, you're out of luck. You won't stand for it, I won't stand for it, the American people won't stand for it. So I hope--we're working with the administration and hopefully we can all work towards the same end goal. I want to take one last opportunity to thank each of you, but, more importantly, the folks that work for you and work for the American people. At any given point in time, everybody at the table's workforce has been challenged to work 24-7 to address events that happened over the worst times, I might say. Over the holidays as we went through Christmas, I can't imagine what the Bureau was doing. I can't imagine, Admiral Rogers, what you were going through. John, I can't imagine what the CIA was going through, trying to track down the number of threat streams that were out there, and that culminates with Director Clapper. So I don't think anybody had a real comfortable holiday season this year. But the fact is we got through it without an event, and I don't think many of us would have bet that that would have been the outcome, but we did. And now we're focused on tomorrow, not yesterday. My hope is that we will continue to do it and to do it successfully. With that, I will tell you how much we look forward to seeing all of you again on Thursday, and this hearing's adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [all]

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